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The politics of economic policy-making in Britain: a re-assessment of the 1976 IMF 
crisis 
Abstract 
Many existing accounts of the IMF crisis have argued that British policy was determined 
either by the exercise of structural power by markets through the creation of currency 
instability and the application of loan conditionality, or by demonstrating that only policies of 
a broadly monetarist persuasion would be sufficient to sustain confidence, a recognition 
which was reached through a process of policy learning.  This paper offers a re-assessment of 
economic policy-making in Britain during the 1976 IMF crisis to show that policy change did 
not occur as a result of disciplinary market pressure or a process of social learning.  It argues 
that state managers have to manage the contradictions between the imperatives of 
accumulation and legitimation, and can do so through the politics of depoliticisation.  It then 
uses archival sources to show how significant elements of the core-executive had established 
preferences for deflationary policies, which were implemented in 1976 by using market 
rhetoric and Fund conditionality to shape perceptions about the range of issues within the 
government‟s scope for discretionary control.   
 






The economic policy autonomy of states is a salient issue in light of discourses on 
globalisation, capital mobility and the embedded nature of agreed principles in international 
economic regimes, which all suggest to varying degrees, that power has shifted away from the 
national state.  Reflecting these positions, many existing accounts of the 1976 IMF crisis 
emphasise the role it played in determining policy British outputs, either through the 
disciplinary potential of markets, or the potential for crisis to act as a catalyst for policy 
learning.  This paper begins by outlining an alternative framework for understanding the 
politics of economic policy-making.  It suggests that the general imperatives of accumulation 
and legitimation are constraints faced by state managers that play a role in determining the 
broad objectives of governments, but cannot determine specific policy outcomes at times of 
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crisis.  It also argues that these imperatives are contradictory, and that these contradictions 
often make it beneficial for governments to invoke market rules and market rhetoric as part of 
a strategy of depoliticisation in order to create the necessary political space to achieve both its 
accumulation and legitimation imperatives simultaneously.  The paper then critically reviews 
existing accounts of the crisis.  It shows how the majority of the literature has emphasised the 
role of crisis in determining policy outputs, and that whilst some empirical accounts have 
shown that policy changes began to take place before the IMF crisis, thereby „plausibilising‟ 
the depoliticisation thesis, they fail to recognise the strategic element to policy-making and 
therefore contribute to the impression that this was a period characterised by uncertainty and 
indecision in policy-making. 
 The article then offers an extensive archive based account of events that shows how 
the principles of depoliticisation were used in order to pursue preferences for deflationary 
policies, which had been established within the Treasuryi since 1974.  It demonstrates how 
cuts in July were achieved through a strategy of preference shaping depoliticisation by encouraging 
perceptions of crisis in the foreign exchange markets despite preferences for depreciation, and 
that the IMF settlement was broadly in line with fiscal cuts the Treasury believed necessary.  It 
also demonstrates that this action had been deferred in anticipation of conditionality for 
political reasons.  This can therefore be characterised as an instance of rules based depoliticisation.  
Far from acting as a disciplinary constraint or a catalyst for learning as existing accounts have 
argued therefore, the 1976 IMF crisis provided the government with the room for manoeuvre 
to implement its established preferences by altering perceptions about the range of policies 
effectively within its scope for discretionary action.   Finally, the paper reflects on what the 
events of 1976 may tell us about the limits of social democratic politics, and suggests that it is 
necessary to consider the possibility that these limits lie not in the market, but are a reflection 
of the contradictions between accumulation and legitimation inherent in the capitalist state 
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form, and that it is these contradictions that have made depoliticisation such an attractive and 
widely deployed governing strategy.   
 
The politics of economic policy-making 
 
It has frequently been asserted that the imperatives of globalisation, capital mobility, and the 
embedded principles of international regimes, mean that an increasing number of actors are 
able to limit the range of policy choices available to state managers by causing currency 
instability, capital flight, and denying access to credit when they do not approve of domestic 
economic policies (see inter alia Helleiner, 1992; Andrews, 1994; Cohen, 1998). However, the 
assumption that political agency is effectively determined by the logic of market forces and 
their disciplinary potential is problematic, and as Watson (2006, 21) notes, the identification of 
„the constraints that the logic emanating from one sphere imposes upon those who seek to act 
in the other‟, represents an artificial division between „the rule of law and systems of exchange 
[…] experienced as a totality within everyday life‟ (ibid, 21).  
By recognising the artificial nature of this distinction, it is possible to see that the state 
has clear and apparently contradictory roles to play in terms of its management of the 
economy and the preservation of the incumbent government‟s legitimacy, which in 
combination can be understood to broadly determine state-managers objectives and their 
limits, but not specific policies.  Firstly, accumulation represents a constraint for state 
managers in so far as the stability of capitalist social relations requires sustainable 
arrangements for production and exchange. Secondly, governments must maintain popular 
domestic support in order to ensure their re-election and preserve the legitimacy of the state‟s 
institutions.  However, because the creation of favourable conditions for accumulation require 
the adoption of policies likely to have social consequences for the labour movement – most 
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obviously lower wages (Kettell, 2004, 19) – and because, where „the political legitimacy of 
government derives from the pursuit of the “national interest” […] policy-making must […] 
display at least a semblant of a connection to the views and wishes of the electorate‟ (Kettell, 
2008, 631), there is a clear contradiction between two of the state‟s principal functions.  
 Whilst at times governments may be able to reconcile these contradictions by taking 
responsibility for a broad range of economic and social issues, it is often beneficial for core-
executives to depoliticise difficult aspects of policy in order to shift any blame for their social 
consequences, by „placing at one remove the political character of decision making‟ (Burnham, 
1999, 45; 2001, 128), or rather, by employing „the range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through 
which politicians can attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos 
that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or specific decision‟ 
(Flinders and Buller, 2006, 295-6). The use of such strategies describe what Hay (1998, 529 
original emphasis) refers to as „the extent to which the parameters of the politically possible 
are circumscribed not by the “harsh economic realities” and “inexorable logics” of 
competitiveness and globalisation, but by perceptions of such logics and realities and by what 
they are held to entail.‟  It is therefore argued that the invocation of „globalisation as an 
exogenous economic constraint‟ can serve to „render the otherwise contingent necessary‟ 
(Watson and Hay, 2003, 290), which for Watson (2006, 197), is part of the socialisation of 
beliefs associating legitimacy with accumulation through the use of rhetoric „which equates 
globalization with a market-based logic of no alternative.‟ 
There are three principle ways in which governments are able to depoliticise difficult 
aspects of policy in this way.  The first of these is institutional depoliticisation, which occurs when 
the government sets the broad objectives of policy but hands responsibility for the day-to-day 
management of policy to an appointed administrator‟ (Flinders and Buller, 2006, 298).  The 
second is rules-based depoliticisation, which involves the incorporation of explicit and binding 
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rules into the policy making process that appear to limit the government‟s ability to exercise 
its own discretion (ibid, 303-4).  The final way in which governments can depoliticise policy 
making is by preference shaping, which involves „recourse to ideological, discursive or rhetorical 
claims in order to justify a political position that a certain issue of focus does, or should, lie 
beyond the scope of politics or the capacity for state control‟ (ibid, 307).    
It comes as no surprise historically that the Treasury and the Bank of England have 
used or attempted to use market forces in order to alter perceptions about the politically 
feasible,ii but despite an awareness of this modus operandi, none of the existing accounts of the 
1976 IMF crisis explicitly makes this case.  Rather, a substantial body of the literature argues 
that the Fund had a decisive influence over British economic policy-making through the 
application of conditionality, or that crisis acted as a catalyst for policy-learning by 
undermining the Keynesian paradigm and creating a realisation amongst political elites that 
only policies of a broadly monetarist persuasion would be sufficient to sustain confidence.  
The next section of the paper offers a review of existing accounts of the crisis.   
 
Decisive influence and social learning 
 
Mark Harmon (1997, 60) develops the „decisive influence‟ argument by equating the Labour 
Government‟s preferences with commitments made by the Labour Party in opposition, 
noting that there was a „leftward tilt [in] policy areas upon which the party, including the 
parliamentary leadership, was publicly agreed.‟  On the basis that it „was only with the explicit 
binding of the British economic authorities that the economic and political crises in Britain in 
1976 were resolved‟, he concludes that „economic policy retrenchment in Britain […] was 
largely the product of coercive external pressures exerted at multiple levels‟ (ibid, 228-9).  This 
argument is developed from the perspective of regime theory, which, he argues, contains an 
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inherent tendency to „confuse international “cooperation” with what might be more 
appropriately characterized as manipulative coercion,‟ and ultimately confuses what at first 
appear to be cooperative structures, with instruments that have to ability to play a significant 
role in disciplining governments by making financial assistance available only with conditions 
attached (ibid, 15-6).  
 Unlike Harmon, Bernstein (1983, 147) includes the Treasury in her analysis in so far as 
is possible without reference to primary documents, but the lack of reference to a broad range 
of official sources conceals the extent to which there were entrenched preferences for 
deflation within key institutions of the policy-making apparatus, and leads to the conclusion 
that „it would be difficult to argue that [IMF cuts] were desired by the government as a whole.‟  
As such, she also suggests that market pressure played a decisive role in shaping policy 
outputs, principally because it played an „important role both in precipitating crises and in the 
stringency of the measures necessary to end them‟ (ibid, 658).  Bernstein (ibid, 657) argues 
that the most important constraint acting on government policy was an „international 
hierarchy of lending‟ that operates as „the framework for international influence‟, the pinnacle 
of which, after the exhaustion of other borrowing possibilities, is the IMF, because the Fund 
is able to „fulfil a set of functions which other creditors are reluctant or unable to perform‟ 
(ibid, 50).  
 A second strand of literature on the IMF crisis focuses on policy learning.  Peter A. 
Hall suggests it is not appropriate to conceive of policy-making in terms of responses to 
various pressures applied to the state, but that it is a „deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or 
techniques of policy in response to past experience‟ (Hall, 1992, 277).  As such, policy is 
understood as a learning response to economic and political circumstances, and that change 
from one discourse of policy-making to another is determined by policy experimentation and 
policy failure (ibid, 280).  This can contribute to explaining change under the 1974-79 Labour 
 7 
Government by suggesting that the introduction of the system of Cash Limits in 1975 was a 
response to the failure of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee system of planning (ibid, 
283), and that the economic policy retrenchment associated with the IMF loan was the 
product of the Keynesian paradigm‟s failure to explain or address the problem of stagflation, 
which required political elites to examine credible alternatives such as the monetarist 
proposals of groups such as the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) (ibid, 285-6).    
 Kevin Hickson likewise notes that during the IMF crisis the ideas of monetarists and 
economic liberals grew in appeal (Hickson, 2005, 188).  He suggests that the most important 
of these ideas were the work of Friedrich von Hayek, supply-side emphasis, the „crowding-
out‟ thesis of Bacon and Elits, and the rejection of the Philips Curve relationship between 
inflation and unemployment (ibid, 181-5).  Burk and Cairncross (1992, ch. 5) also identify a 
movement of opinion away from Keynesian approaches to policy-making in the context of its 
apparent failure to either account for or respond to economic conditions in Britain, and note 
that the views of monetarists, the „New Cambridge School‟, and protectionists, gained 
increasing credence in 1976.   It is therefore the contention of these accounts, that the failure 
of established modes of economic governance to produce solutions to economic crises was 
the catalyst for the adoption of new ideas in the policy-making arena. 
 More recently, an extended empirical account of the crisis has been provided by then 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Douglas Wass (2008), which has contributed to the 
study of British economic policy-making in this period by providing an extensive 
administrative history of the period.  This has cast considerable doubt on the extent to which 
economic crisis and Fund conditionality played a decisive role in determining policy outputs, 
however the most important contribution to de-mystifying commonly understood 
perceptions of the IMF crisis is that of Ludlam.  He identifies „four myths‟ of the crisis, noting 
that Healey had introduced substantial cuts in the April 1975 Budget and February 1976 
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Public Expenditure white paper, that cash limits were in place on three-quarters of voted 
government expenditure by April 1975, that monetary targets had been set in July 1976 as 
significant but not critical targets, and that the commitment to full employment had 
effectively been abandoned as a primary aim of policy at the time of the government‟s mildly 
deflationary first budget (Ludlam, 1992 716-24).  He therefore concludes that „the IMF deal 
merely codified a change of political course already well underway and proceeding under the 
stewardship of British social democracy‟ (ibid, 727).  
 By presenting an accurate timeline of events, these accounts have played a significant 
role in „plausibilising‟ the depoliticisation thesis, however neither account acknowledges the 
strategic element to economic policy-making in this period.  Indeed, Wass (2008, 345) argues 
that the fact „that there was no specific contingency plan for the events of 1976 is clear from 
the documents‟.  Ludlam (1992, 723) offers the closest suggestion that the government aimed 
to depoliticise policy with his assertion that the adoption of broadly monetarist policies was 
geared principally at forming public opinion, however he stops short of suggesting that this 
was part of a fully formed governing strategy, and the absence of the explicit recognition of a 
strategic element to policy is significant because it does nothing to rebuff characterisations of 
this period as one of uncertainty and indecision in policy-making. 
 The rest of this paper is dedicated to presenting an empirical account of events in 
1976, which builds on the observations of Ludlam, but demonstrates the way in which the 
Treasury and the Labour Government used market rhetoric and IMF conditionality in order 
to depoliticise the consequences of retrenchment in a strategic way.  It begins by identifying 
the broad preferences of the Treasury, the Labour Movement and the Labour Party, and 
shows that despite commitments under the Social Contract, significant elements in the higher 
echelons of the Treasury and elements of the government had strong preferences for 
deflation.  As these preferences pre-date the onset of crisis, policy change should be 
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understood to reflect the established preferences of British policy-makers and not the 
disciplinary potential of markets or a process of policy learning based on policy 
experimentation and policy failure.  The paper then shows how these preferences for 
deflationary policies became more widely accepted at the political level and were implemented 
by invoking exchange rate and external financing constraints in the first half of the year 
(broadly preference shaping depoliticisation), and by associating policy change with IMF 
conditionality at the end of the year (broadly rules based depoliticisation).  The paper concludes 
with some reflections about what the use of strategies of depoliticisation by a government 
elected on a progressive social-democratic platform in order to pursue established preferences 
for deflation can tell us about the limits of social-democracy, and the realities of market based 
„logics of no alternative‟.  
 
The TUC, The Labour Party and the Treasury, 1974-76 
 
The preferences of both the Trade Union movement and the Labour Party after the 1974 
general elections are adequately captured by both the February and October manifestos, 
which were strongly based in a 1973 TUC/Labour Party Liaison Committee document calling 
for the implementation of an „alternative strategy‟, which advocated a „large-scale redistribution 
of income and wealth‟ (TUC /Labour Party Liaison Committee, 1973, 313).  On investment, 
employment and growth, the document called for the expansion and investment and the 
control of capital administered through „effective public supervision of the investment of 
large private corporations‟ (ibid, 314), in addition to greater industrial and economic 
democracy based on „agreement and not on compulsion‟.  It furthermore noted that whilst 
„there is great scope for seeking to reach recommendations through tripartite machinery […] 
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in the field of collective bargaining, such recommendations can only be incorporated in 
collective agreements voluntarily reached by the process of negotiation‟ (ibid, 315).   
 The Party (1974a, 192; 1974b, 213) had campaigned on the promise to bring about „a 
fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of the 
working people and their families‟ in the general elections of both February and October 
1974, and this „Social Contract‟ between the Labour Party and the TUC has been perceived as 
the key in „establishing a deal in which the unions would support the government‟s attempts 
to fight inflation by curbing their wage demands [in return for] favourable industrial policy, 
unemployment relief and structural modernization‟ (Koelble, 1987, 257).  However, such 
interpretations are somewhat caricatured, and Taylor (2000, 210) has noted that „the 1973 
Liaison Committee document was little more than a shopping list of TUC demands.‟  
Although the 1974 manifesto commitments closely reflected the 1973 liaison committee 
document, as Wickham-Jones (1996, 31-2) notes, within the Labour Party the National 
Executive Committee controls medium-term policy-making whilst in opposition, and the 
Parliamentary Labour Party is able to reassert control whilst in government.  This means that 
it is by no means certain that policy documents disseminated whilst in opposition have any 
real reflection on the views of those at the sharp end of government, which become 
increasingly apparent whilst in office.  
 The Treasury also had strong preferences for economic policy.  These were shaped by 
the view that systemic stability was dependent on reversing Britain‟s relative economic decline, 
and recognised that the potential for these policies to create political unrest because of their 
impact on general standards of living would mean the successful realisation of these policies 
would involve altering the expectations of the British people and those on the left of the 
Labour Party. These preferences became demonstrably apparent at the end of the 1974, as 
officials „had at last concluded that existing policies were not sustainable‟ (Dell, 1996, 410).  
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The official position was presented to the Chancellor in December, when the Permanent 
Secretary, Sir Douglas Wass, authored a paper on the broad priorities for British economic 
policy, arguing that situation was serious in three respects.  Firstly, the rate of pay increases 
was inconsistent with a reduction in the rate of inflation.  Secondly, the balance of payments 
was forecast to be up to £1 billion worse in 1975 than in 1974.  Finally, and contingent on this 
position, it was argued that the prospective public sector deficit would be unsustainable on 
confidence grounds (The National Archives [TNA] T 277/3053, PCC (74) 4, 20 December 
1974, 1-2).  Wass therefore advocated direct intervention in the wage determination process 
and a reduction in the public sector‟s financial deficit through increases in taxation and 
reductions in expenditure (ibid, 3).  
 When Wass suggested this course he noted that it „may well be that the Chancellor will 
feel that it is politically out of the question for him to embrace the recommendations […] put 
forward‟, but qualified this statement, noting that this may only be the case „without the 
external crisis which would justify it‟ (TNA T 277/3053, PCC (74) 4, 20 December 1974, 5).  
The potential for market logic to alter expectations about what could be expected from 
economic policy-making was therefore clearly recognised within the Treasury, and throughout 
1975 and 1976 the use of market rhetoric in the context of the prevailing exchange rate 
strategy afforded the government considerable room for manoeuvre. 
 
The exchange rate, the June stand-by and the July measures 
  
It had been a long-standing objective of the Treasury to secure depreciation of sterling in 
order to help improve the competitive position of British industry.  When sterling had come 
under pressure in early 1975, a review of the Bank of England‟s intervention strategy 
concluded that because it was the Treasury‟s „intention to get the rate down […] we ought not 
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to slog away spending money to try and stop this happening‟ (TNA T 358/207, Barratt to 
Wass, 22 April 1975, 1).  It was an established intention of the government therefore, to allow 
depreciation which relied „to the maximum extent possible on autonomous factors […] so 
that the main responsibility for depreciation is seen to lie elsewhere than with HMG‟ (TNA T 
358/207, Walker to Mitchell, 11 April 1975, 1).  This remained the official view at the 
beginning of 1976.  
 In February it was noted that achieving the necessary improvement in competitiveness 
without undue costs in terms of unemployment would require „depreciation of about 20 [per 
cent]‟ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 6th Meeting, 16 February 1976, 1), implying a preference 
to see the pound fall from $2.02 (Bank of England, 1976, table 29) to around $1.60.  
However, the size of the desired depreciation created difficulties, because under the floating 
rate system there was no mechanism by which it could be achieved in an orderly way.  As a 
result the Treasury‟s view was that only depreciation of 10 per cent within the year would be 
possible (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 7th Meeting, 18 February 1976, 2).  This was seen to 
have potential domestic political benefits in so far as it would be possible to rally the support 
of the trade unions in the event of a slide in the pound, and that „they would welcome a 
reduction in interest rates designed to achieve a slide on grounds of domestic policy‟  (ibid, 4).   
 In light of these assessments, the Minimum Lending Rate was cut by a quarter of one 
percent on 5 March.  This occurred in the wake of a short-lived demand for sterling the 
previous morning, which had prompted the Bank to intervene in the markets to cream off 
dollars and prevent a rise in the rate, but created a view in the market that the Bank had been 
selling on a falling market.  As such, the rate fell to $1.91 (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 14th 
Meeting, 11 March 1976, 1), and it has been noted of the subsequent fall in the pound that, 
„the impression was given, and remains, that the Bank of England and the Treasury between 
them could have handled the affair better‟  (Browning, 1986, 72).  However, neither British 
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officials nor ministers were concerned by the fall in the rate.  At the Treasury Policy Co-
ordinating Committee (PCC) it was noted that „it was important to hold onto the present 
advantages and not allow the rate to creep up‟ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 14th Meeting, 11 
March 1976, 2), whilst the Chancellor informed the Ministerial Committee on Economic 
Strategy on 17 March that „it would for the present be wise to take any opportunity to let the 
pound float downward‟ (TNA CAB 134/4048, MES (76) 6th Meeting, 17 March 1976, 3).  
This view was advanced on the basis of the claim that the 4.5 per cent depreciation that this 
represented was nearly half of what the Treasury deemed appropriate for the year, however as 
shown above, it is more accurate to view the slide as 25 per cent of what the Treasury had 
deemed desirable, but 50 per cent of what had been deemed feasible.  The fall in the rate 
however, presented the opportunity for the Treasury to argue that the lack of confidence in 
sterling was placing the reserves in jeopardy, and that action was necessary in order to reverse 
it, despite the fact that it was in favour of the pound‟s decline.   
 The argument for a fiscal reduction began to emerge significantly at the end of April 
in light of concerns about additional claims being made on the contingency reserve.  At 
Cabinet on 29 April, the Chancellor informed his colleagues that high levels of public 
expenditure were the cause of problems in the market, and that „there was a serious danger 
that foreign confidence would collapse‟ (TNA CAB 128/59, CM (76) 2nd Conclusions, 29 
April 1976, 8).  This hostility to public expenditure was confirmed in an inter-departmental 
meeting of public finance officials on 4 May, which recognised that „no programmes could be 
sacrosanct in these circumstances (TNA T 371/87, Jones to Pliatzky, 4 May 1976, 1), and 
significantly, it was noted that officials „did not want to rule out savings that would require 
legislation and there was even a willingness to recognise that transfer payments […] might 
have to be cut in real terms as part of a general reduction in living standards‟ (ibid, 1).  As a 
result, the Chancellor argued that „a considerable body of opinion […] believes we ought to 
 14 
be cutting public expenditure this year; and that if we fail to do this of our own free will, we 
will sooner or later be compelled to do so‟ (TNA CAB 129/189, CP (76) 15, 14 May 1976, 1).   
 At the beginning of June, Britain and the G10 negotiated agreement of a $5.3 billion 
stand-by in order to bolster the reserves, which would be available for six months, whilst 
within the Treasury, attention turned to making the case for public expenditure cuts.  On 21 
June Wass said that the first argument for cuts „was that our creditors would demand a cut in 
the borrowing requirement and they had a strong preference for seeing this achieved through 
public expenditure‟, and the second was that „there could well be pressure on resources in the 
manufacturing sector next year‟ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 24th Meeting, 21 June 1976, 3).  
However, it was also noted that the Chancellor required a case that „went beyond merely 
asserting that our creditors would demand it‟ (ibid, 3).  At the following meeting of PCC 
therefore, it was argued that „for the Government to take visible action to reduce the fiscal 
deficit would improve confidence‟ and that „the market would judge that it would ease the 
UK‟s difficulty of financing so large a PSBR in 1977/78‟ (TNA T 277/3175, (PCC) 76 25th 
Meeting, 23 June 1976, 1), which had, in the first instance, been amplified by sterling‟s 
weakness and the Treasury‟s approach to exchange rate management.  
 The Overseas Finance Division believed cuts required were in the order of £2 billion 
(ibid, 2).  Lord Kaldor went further than this, arguing that any potential package should „raise 
the total [reduction in the PSBR] to the rage of £3 billion for 1977/78‟ (TNA T 364/17, 
Kaldor to Healey, 1 July 1976, 8), however calls for cuts of this size faced a considerable 
degree of political hostility from the Labour left.  On 2 July it was argued at a meeting of the 
Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy there was unlikely to be pressure on resources 
in 1977, meaning the government would have to square a circle with the TUC if it was to 
avoid being accused of cutting expenditure for invalid reasons (TNA CAB 134/4025, EY (76) 
9th Meeting, 2 July 1976, 5), but despite these objections and in light of the view that „the 
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financial case [for cuts] was overwhelming‟ (ibid, 7), the matter was referred to full Cabinet so 
that decisions could be made.     
 When the matter went to full Cabinet, Tony Benn put his alternative strategy forward.  
He proposed that the government introduce measures to restrict non-essential imports, 
increase taxation on imported goods, take direct measures to increase home production, and 
attempt to reconcile the international community with these policies (TNA CAB 129/190, CP 
(76) 43, 2 July 1976, 1-4).  However, there was no substantive discussion of such a strategy at 
Cabinet, on the basis of objections raised earlier in the year.  It had been noted that there was 
no guarantee that import controls would aid the efficiency of British industry, and that there 
would be implications for the British standard of living caused by supply shortages that would 
contribute to creating „a psychology of shortage‟ (TNA CAB 134/4025, EY (76) 19, 27 May 
1976, 32).  In contrast, the Chancellor put the case that the G10 stand-by had only bought 
time and that because a substantial amount had been drawn it was necessary to implement „a 
package which will re-establish confidence in our economic policies to a degree which enables 
us to rebuild our reserves and avoid being forced to the International Monetary Fund to repay 
our drawings on the $5.3 billion stand-by‟ (TNA CAB 129/191, CP (76) 52, 13 July 1976, 2), 
and on the basis of this established viewiii that alternative strategies would have worse 
prospects than retrenchment, Cabinet majority concluded that there was an urgent need to cut 
the PSBR (see TNA CAB 128/59, CM (76) 13th Conclusions, 6 July 1976).  
 Subsequently, preparations of a package to reduce the PSBR to £9 billion began, and 
cuts were announced to the House of Commons on 22 July.  The slide in the rate that the 
Treasury favoured had allowed officials to begin making the argument in favour of the cuts it 
desired to restore confidence, take pressure off of the reserves, and assist with external 
financing difficulties.  The G10 stand-by reinforced this view, and despite Wass‟ (2008, 350-1) 
assertion that the loan „had no confidence or operational value‟, the Chancellor‟s reference to 
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Britain‟s repayment obligation in support of cuts shows that it had value in terms of winning 
the political argument over the July measures by shaping views about what the government 
could feasibly achieve.   Market rhetoric and market rules continued to be used in this way 
during the 1976 IMF crisis. 
 
The 1976 IMF crisis 
 
It is useful to look at the IMF crisis in three phases in order to demonstrate the extent to 
which policy outcomes were in accord with the established preferences of the Treasury and 
the Chancellor of Exchequer, and how other opinions were reconciled with these views 
through the politics of depoliticisation.  The first phase involves the period during which the 
case for going to the Fund was made, by arguing that market forces would otherwise make 
Britain‟s external financing gap unbridgeable. During the second phase, negotiations with the 
Fund were delayed by the limited negotiating brief given to Treasury officials and 
disagreements over forecasts, which was beneficial in creating an impression that Britain had 
not simply acquiesced in Fund conditionality, even though there was considerable overlap 
between the views of the Treasury and the IMF teams.  Finally, it was necessary to win the 
political argument, which was achieved by noting that the IMF conditions meant 
retrenchment must occur, and that the issue of confidence meant that any alternative course 
would involve even greater sacrifices.    
 The first phase of the IMF crisis began in September, when despite the fact that 
sterling had remained stable throughout July and August in a band between $1.76 and $1.80, a 
paper was circulated to PCC arguing that there was no alternative to an application to the 
IMF because the current deficit was forecast at £1.5 billion for the second half of 1976 and 
£3 billion for 1977 (TNA T 277/3178, PCC (76) 53, 3 September 1976, 1).  It went on to 
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argue that despite current large interest rate differentials in Britain‟s favour, it was unrealistic 
to expect a large-scale sterling in-flow and that despite limited possibilities for public sector 
borrowing „there is still a substantial gap in each period to be met by recourse to multilateral 
facilities or the reserves‟ (ibid, 1).  As sterling weakness persisted, Callaghan decided that „he 
did not favour continued heavy spending to support the rate‟, and as such, on 9 September 
the Bank of England withdrew from the foreign exchange market (TNA T 277/3175, PCC 
(76) 31st Meeting, 9 September 1976, 1).   
 At the following PCC meeting, Douglass Wass noted that the situation demonstrated 
that securing adequate interim finance was the overriding objective of economic strategy, and 
that in light of this, the „need to reduce unemployment and the industrial strategy would have 
to be put on the back burner‟ (TNA T 277/3175, PCC (76) 32nd Meeting, 14 September 1976, 
1).  Leo Pliatzky, head of the public sector side of the Treasury, also made the case that 
„economically there could be no doubt that a major downward adjustment was still needed, 
including further reductions in public expenditure‟, despite the fact that this would pose 
political problems (ibid, 2), and the Overseas Finance Division noted that „plainly further 
unequivocal deflation would be helpful‟ (ibid, 2-3).  In light of the fact that the Treasury had 
not been able to achieve a cut of the size desired in July therefore, a weight of official opinion 
believed that an agreement with the Fund that included a fiscal reduction was desirable.  
 On the basis of these recommendations, Healey put the case for a Fund drawing to 
the Economic Strategy committee on 23 September, and it was agreed that officials should 
open negotiations with the IMF on the basis of existing policies (see TNA CAB 134/4025, 
EY (76) 13th Meeting, 23 September 1976) on the grounds that Britain needed to repay the 
G10 stand-by, and the level of the reserves was „not even the equivalent to two months‟ 
imports‟ (TNA CAB 134/4026, EY (76) 41, 23 September 1976, 4).  However, if „existing 
policies‟ were thought to be a plausible basis for agreement, it demonstrated a degree of 
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naivety on the part of ministers, as officials were acutely aware of the extent to which 
agreement to draw from the Fund would involve the kind of deflationary action they believed 
necessary in order to solve long-term external financing difficulties.  Indeed, Overseas 
Finance had written to the Chancellor‟s Principal Private Secretary advising that a negotiation 
with the Fund „is a real one and cannot be turned into a mere charade‟ because „the 
programme we present must be defensible‟ (TNA T 381/15, Littler to Monck, 23 July 1976, 
1).  
 In the wake of a Sunday Times article at the end of October suggesting the UK and the 
IMF had agreed that sterling should settle at $1.50, which created further sterling weakness, 
the recognition of the ability for the IMF to act as a buttress between the government and the 
consequences of deflationary policies was most clearly recognised.  The Governor of the 
Bank, Gordon Richardson, noted that any intervention in the exchange markets to stabilise 
the rate should be „preceded by an announcement of a comprehensive package […] with a 
large public expenditure element‟ before the IMF negotiations (TNA T 378/22, Note of a 
Meeting, 25 October 1976, 2), a view shared by the head of Overseas Finance, Derek 
Mitchell, who thought a further cut of £2 billion would be appropriate (ibid, 2).  However, 
because of the political implications of making such a sizeable cut, and the fact that it was 
widely known that „those who would lend us the large sums required would insist on policy 
measures‟, the Chancellor accepted a „majority view that we should [defer] announcement of 
fiscal action until after the IMF negotiations‟ (ibid, 2-3).     
 Application to the Fund was therefore made on the basis that agreement with the IMF 
was essential if Britain were to bridge its external financing gap, and whilst it was recognised 
that borrowing from the Fund would involve cuts, officials were in favour of them.  As such, 
and in recognition of widespread expectation of conditionality, the Chancellor decided to 
delay the desired fiscal action until the Fund arrived.  The second phase of the IMF crisis 
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began with the arrival of the Fund team on November 1, however substantive discussion was 
considerably delayed by the limited negotiating mandate of the Treasury team, and the extent 
of substantive differences between the two groups was greatly amplified by the wide margins 
of error to which the National Income Forecast (NIF) was subject.   
 The NIF suggested that slack in the world economy had required an upward revision 
of the PSBR from £9 billion to £11 billion.  On this basis the Chancellor argued that „faced 
with this prospect, I do not think it would be right to take no action, even if our creditors 
would allow us‟ (TNA CAB 134/4026, EY (76) 54, 2 November 1976, 3-4), and Kenneth 
Berrill of the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), noted that there was „clearly a great deal to 
be said for taking further deflationary action‟ (TNA PREM 16/836, Berrill to Callaghan, 2 
November 1976, 4).  Derek Mitchell went so far as to suggest that the PSBR should be closer 
to £8 billion than £9 billion, with the majority of the reduction coming from public 
expenditure (TNA T 381/17, Mitchell to Monck, 4 November 1976, 1-2).   
 Despite the clear view amongst officials that a substantial fiscal reduction was 
required, Wass informed PCC that in negotiations with the Fund, „on no account should 
officials express any view, except on his specific authority, about what policy changes were 
desirable.  The discussion should be entirely technical and exploratory‟ (TNA T 277/3175, 
PCC (76) 38th Meeting, 2 November 1976, 3).  This approach was beneficial in terms of the 
presentational advantages that would come from the appearance that officials had strongly 
resisted cuts, which were enhanced by the Fund‟s disagreement with the NIF.  After the 
opening presentation on 8 November, the leader of the Fund team, Alan Whittome, noted 
that „the forecasts simply did not add up‟ (TNA PREM 16/800, Littler to Wass, 8 November 
1976, 1), and on the following day said „he had detected that everyone in the Treasury had 
clammed up on discussion of policy changes‟ (TNA T 364/50, Mitchell to Wass, 9 November 
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1976, 1).  Whilst this indicates that negotiations had stalled, it was in relation to issues of 
procedure, not of principle.   
 When Healey met Whittome on 11 November, he indicated that it would not be 
possible to secure a PSBR reduction in the region of £3-5 billion, and that it would be easier 
to get a broader negotiating mandate if the Fund gave „some idea of the changes they thought 
would be desirable‟ (TNA T 364/50, Note of a Meeting, 11 November 1976, 3).  Whittome 
seems to have interpreted this suggestion as an attempt by Chancellor to set the Fund up as 
the architect of deflation in the UK, and agreed to this only „provided the Chancellor could 
give a personal assurance that this procedure would not lead to a pillorying of the Fund team 
for attempting to impose policies on the British Government‟ (ibid, 4).   
When Whittome returned with his suggestions on 16 November, he qualified the 
Fund‟s position by noting that the PSBR forecast it had applied was nearly £1 billion lower 
than the Treasury‟s.  He also noted that because it was the outturn figure that was of critical 
importance, it would be appropriate to think of the Fund‟s lower forecast as the figure from 
which a reduction needed to be made (TNA T 381/17, Note of a Meeting, 16 November 
1976, 2).  Therefore, despite the appearance of an impasse, the negotiating position between 
the two sides was reduced by £1 billion without any substantive discussion of a fiscal 
adjustment. 
 On 17 November Treasury officials were given a broadened mandate to explore a 
„PSBR in 1977-78 lower than the £10.9 billion in the October forecast […] but they should 
refuse to discuss anything lower than £9 billion (TNA CAB 134/4025, EY (76) 19th Meeting, 
17 November 1976, 5).  Nevertheless, negotiations continued to be frustrated by the team‟s 
inability to discuss actual policy changes.  This became particularly apparent on 19 November, 
when Pliatzky informed Whittome that he had no authority to discuss what would have to 
occur to reduce the PSBR by £3-4 billion for 1978/79, who responded by saying he „wanted 
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to see “serious figures” of what could be obtained‟ (TNA T 371/25, Note of a Meeting, 19 
November 1976, 5).  On the same day however, in response to Whittome‟s view that the 
PSBR for 1977/78 should be in the range of £8-8.5 billion and for 1978/79 should be around 
£6.5 billion, Wass „accepted that, in principle, a two year programme of the type they 
envisaged was a reasonable proposition‟ (TNA T 371/25, Wass to Monck, 19 November 
1976, 1-2), and with the clear demonstration that the Treasury and the Fund were in 
agreement, it became necessary to negotiate political objections to cuts.   
 The beginning of Cabinet discussions marks the beginning of the final phase of the 
crisis.  However, the case for agreement and the cuts this involved had to be made beyond 
doubt, which involved convincing the Labour left that the approach proposed by the 
Chancellor, the Treasury and the Fund was correct.  Once again, it was made with reference 
to the logic of market forces based on the notion that there was no alternative to a large 
downward fiscal adjustment if British economic strategy was to be sustainable over the long-
term. This process began with the Chancellor‟s paper of 22 November, which associated 
current stability with expectations of a credible IMF package, noted that the Fund‟s aim of a 
PSBR of around £8.5 billion in 1977/78 was about right (TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 111, 
22 November 1976, 1-3), and was followed by his assertion at Cabinet that although „the 
situation was very difficult […] it would be worse if the negotiations broke down‟ (TNA CAB 
128/60, CM (76) 33rd Conclusions, 23 November 1976, 1).  The argument however, did not 
resonate with the whole Cabinet, Anthony Crosland arguing that the „proposed reduction in 
the PSBR in 1977-78 could not be defended on any reasonable grounds‟ (ibid, 3), which led 
the Prime Minister to conclude that „many of the Cabinet at present felt that the scale of the 
public expenditure cuts at present proposed was too great to accept‟ (ibid, 4).            
 On this basis Callaghan informed the Fund team of the political difficulties being 
faced.  However, because, „to the IMF a PSBR of £9.5 billion for 1977/78 was not convincing 
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because they were sure it would not appear convincing to millions of bankers all over the 
world‟ (TNA T 364/50, Note of a Meeting, 23 November 1976, 3), it was agreed, without 
Cabinet approval, that the Treasury and Fund teams begin considering the implications of a 
reduction in the PSBR to £8.5, £9 and £9.5 billion (ibid, 5). The three packages were 
presented to Cabinet for discussion on 1 December, when a full examination of alternative 
possibilities would also be considered, under the clear understanding that it would be difficult 
to reach agreement with the Fund on anything less than the largest package (see TNA PREM 
16/803, Healey to Callaghan, 25 November 1976, 9).  In recognition of this view, Healey 
submitted a paper arguing that his judgement, „reached independently of the Fund – is that 
there is a powerful case for a fiscal adjustment‟ which should „reduce the PSBR to something 
like £8.5 billion in 1977/78 and perhaps to a similar figure the following year‟ (TNA CAB 
129/193, CP (76) 123, 30 November 1976, 3).  He concluded that although the proposals „are 
not agreeable and will be difficult to sell to the Party and the TUC […] if there were a better 
or more viable set of policies [he] should propose them‟ (ibid, 6).   
 At this meeting, the left of the Cabinet made their opinions vocal, demonstrating they 
did not believe the Treasury or the Chancellor‟s argument that there was no alternative to the 
IMF loan by making their own proposals, the most radical of which was once again Tony 
Benn‟s advocacy of the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES).  He argued that Britain should 
introduce overall import quotas for manufactures, enforce exchange controls, introduce a 
Capital Investments Committee to channel investment to priority areas, and take reserve 
powers to introduce planning agreements through the National Enterprise Board.  He 
furthermore argued that this would be compatible with an agreement with the IMF because of 
the degree of international interdependence in the world economy (TNA CAB 129/193, CP 
(76) 117, 29 November 1976, 4-6).  Anthony Crosland took a similar line, noting that by 
threatening to impose protectionist measures, „we shall find that the IMF cannot afford not to 
 23 
give us the loan‟ (TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 118, 29 November 1976, 2).  Peter Shore 
furthermore noted that the case against import controls had been overstated, that there was 
no evidence that they would create excess demand and therefore force rationing, and that 
there was no case for retaliation by other nations under international law (TNA CAB 
129/193, CP (76) 124, 30 November 1976, 3).   
 Despite these arguments however, no new work was commissioned on the feasibility 
of import controls implied by an alternative strategy, and papers on the issue prepared by the 
CPRS in October were simply circulated to Cabinet under new cover.  The case against noted 
that whilst an alternative approach may work in theory, in practice it „ignores the practical 
implications of the immediate situation [and] disguises or assumes away, a number of 
fundamental difficulties, which will in practice prevent it from achieving the results claimed‟ 
(TNA CAB 129/193, CP (76) 116, 30 November 1976, case against, 1).  Firstly, it argued that 
it would not be possible to „get all the fences up fast enough to prevent a collapse of sterling.‟  
Secondly, that the scheme would be „contrary to [European] Community Law‟, that Britain 
„would certainly be exposed to retaliation by other countries‟ and that it would undermine „the 
whole philosophy behind our international policies – both political and economic‟ (ibid, 2-3).  
Finally, it was suggested that it assumed that industry would reorganise itself competitively 
and that there was „no reason to think that protection – even in the absence of retaliation – 
would produce anything of the kind‟ (ibid, 6).   
 Fay and Young (28 May 1978, 33) note that at Cabinet on 1 December, Healey „used 
Benn‟s argument as an object for derision‟, and in general discussion it was noted that if 
Britain were unable to finance the deficit after imposing import controls it might be necessary 
to resort to drastic measures such as rationing, and that this risk was unacceptable on the 
grounds that if the IMF refused to make the loan available on these terms, „the country would 
be facing a bankrupt situation‟ (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 35th Conclusions, annex, 2).  This 
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cleared the way for Healey to argue once again that „without the IMF loan the external deficit 
could not be financed, there would be no safety net for the sterling balances, no acquiescence 
by other countries in a scheme of import deposits, and no bilateral lending‟ (ibid, annex, 6).  
This led to Cabinet agreement to continue attempts to settle with the Fund (ibid, annex, 7), 
and on the following day Callaghan noted that „the majority took the view that in order to get 
the loan there should be an adjustment of £1.5 billion in 1977-78 which the Chancellor 
should lead to one of £2 billion in 1978-79‟ (TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 36th Conclusions, 2 
December 1976, annex, 7).   
 Whilst the argument that there was no alternative to the Fund‟s conditions was 
successful in securing Cabinet agreement to reduce the PSBR to £8.7 billion in 1977/78, the 
second year of the package was still unresolved, and when discussed on 3 December looked 
to be leading the parties towards an impasse.  The Fund‟s Managing Director, Johannes 
Witteveen, informed Healey he wanted an adjustment of £3 billion, to which Healey said he 
could „take a running jump‟ (TNA PREM 16/805, Note of a meeting, 3 December 1976, 1).  
However, this agreement was resolved simply by introducing „a contingent undertaking to do 
more than the Chancellor had proposed to Cabinet in 1978/79, which would be linked to 
achieving a lower level of unemployment than was now forecast‟ (ibid, 4), and carrying 
Cabinet was the final obstacle to achieving the cuts desired by the Treasury.  The case for 
taking this action was decisively made in a note by Wass on contingencies for the event Fund 
negotiations broke down.  He argued that if negotiations failed, sterling would be subject to 
an attack which would require a substantial package of public expenditure cuts of up to £1000 
million, increases in duties on tobacco, alcohol and oil of £430 million, plus the sale of £500 
million of BP shares in addition to a scheme of import deposits that would contract the 
economy sharply, which was a more severe approach than that required by the Fund (TNA 
PREM 16/805, Wass to Callaghan, 5 December 1976, annex, 3-6).   
 25 
 On this basis, Cabinet was informed on 6 December that it was a matter of urgency to 
give shape to the package, which involved immediate agreement of £1 billion cuts for 
1977/78 and £1.5 billion cuts for 1978/79, which may later be revised dependent on the 
performance of the British economy relative to a target growth rate of 3.5 per cent (TNA 
CAB 128/60, CM (76) 37th Conclusions, 6 December 1976, annex, 1-2).  The remainder of 
the meeting, and subsequent discussions on 7 Decemberiv were devoted to discussing public 
expenditure programmes, whilst attention in the Treasury and the Fund teams turned to 
finalising the wording of the letter of intent, and setting targets for Domestic Credit 
Expansion compatible with the agreed PSBR targets.  This work was completed in the early 
hours of 13 December, with targets set at £7.7 billion for 1977/78 and £6 billion for 1978/78 




The agreement of the letter of intent concluded the IMF negotiations substantively, and in 
accordance with a theme that consistently emerges throughout 1976.  This begins with the 
statement of Treasury preferences for fiscal reductions, often supported by the Chancellor, 
and opposition from the left of the Labour Party on the grounds that deflation would have 
profound social and political consequences.  The subsequent appearance of acute economic 
crisis in the foreign exchange markets and the implications for external financing then allowed 
the Treasury to argue, despite its preference for depreciation, that the measures it had 
advocated were absolutely necessary in order to ensure that Britain could continue to finance 
its external deficit because this was the only way in which confidence could be restored.  In 
June and July 1976, the argument that failure to act would fundamentally undermine British 
economic strategy was clearly used as a way of creating a political argument that the level of 
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the PSBR was, for all intents and purposes, beyond the control of the government because of 
its dependence on confidence.  
 As it became clear that these cuts had not achieved the scale of reduction deemed 
appropriate by the Treasury and conservative elements of the Labour leadership, it was 
decided to delay fiscal action until after the IMF negotiations on political grounds.  At this 
stage the IMF came to play an important role in justifying further expenditure cuts in two 
ways.  Firstly, delaying the negotiations by limiting the Treasury‟s negotiating mandate and 
inviting the Fund to take the initiative helped to foster the impression that the Treasury was 
resisting calls for deflation that originated from the IMF, even though British officials were in 
broad agreement.  In this respect, conditionality was notional, but represented a credible rule 
onto which the consequences of deflationary policies could be shifted.   Secondly, by 
identifying agreement with the Fund as the keystone to the credibility of British economic 
strategy, a convincing case was made that any alternative course would produce a worse 
outcome than that implied by agreement with the IMF.  It is therefore the case that during 
1976, and specifically during the IMF crisis, competing interests within the British state were 
resolved in favour of addressing decline by reducing the public sector‟s claim on resources, 
firstly through what can aptly be described as a process of preference shaping depoliticisation in 
July, and ultimately, through rules based depoliticisation during the IMF crisis itself. 
 By demonstrating the way in which policy-makers used economic crises and the 
appearance of economic crisis to create political opportunities to implement deflationary 
policies throughout 1976, the findings offer the opportunity for reflection on the limits of 
social-democratic policies.  It is especially interesting to question why, despite being elected 
on a progressive left-wing platform, once in office, the Labour government accepted 
preferences for deflation and the prioritisation of its balance of payments and competitiveness 
objectives ahead of social priorities.  As Hay (1998, 529, original emphasis) succinctly phrases 
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it, we need to question whether „space for alternative welfare trajectories does indeed exist, but it is no 
longer to perceived to exist’, or whether it is „a distinct absence of political imagination and/or a 
severe dose of political fatalism‟ that subordinates social policy to accumulation.   
In the case of the IMF crisis, the fact that AES and its variants competed for political 
acceptance with orthodox deflationary approaches, whether or not they could have worked in 
practice and despite the failure of those involved in broader debates about economic policy to 
win over those at the heart of the policy-making process, suggests that there was no lack of 
imagination or political fatalism; there were clearly individuals making alternative proposals 
and willing to argue for them.  A superficially attractive alternative explanation is that the 
Treasury suffers from an institutional inertia that frustrates change, that its expertise has 
placed it in a powerful position relative to ministers, and that this has allowed it to „bounce‟ 
ministers into policies with which they do not agree.  Arguments of this kind however, are 
objectionable the grounds that they reflect a way of  „talking about the Treasury as though the 
Department was somehow separate from its ministers and could operate without them‟, when 
in fact, the Treasury is only able to circulate documents to Cabinet under cover of the 
Chancellor or the Chief Secretary if they are also a Cabinet member (Pliatzky, 1984, 130).    
A more theoretically robust suggestion is that „the limits of social democracy are not 
simply the limits of leadership or political programmes but are the limits of the capitalist state 
form itself‟ (Burnham, 2008, 62).  It is widely accepted that order in society is both dependent 
on the sustainability of systems of production and exchange and the legitimacy of its political 
authorities, and whilst these constraints cannot determine specific policies, both must be 
understood as playing a role in determining governments‟ general objectives.  However, the 
subordinate role of the majority of individuals in the system of production and the political 
authorities‟ dependence on their support to preserve legitimacy, demonstrates that there are 
clear contradictions in social and economic relations in capitalist societies. These general 
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constraints and the contradictions therein mean that governments are not able to completely 
subject the interests of capital to labour or vice versa without undermining social relations more 
generally, and there nevertheless remains considerable room for manoeuvre within these 
boundaries so long as social and economic relations can be managed.  Recognising this can 
help foster an understanding of the sustainable limits of social-democratic endeavours in a 
way that cannot be reduced to simplistic structural functionalism or overt „politicism‟, and is 
therefore worthy of further empirical examination so that these boundaries may be more 
clearly defined, alternative strategies for managing social relations within them more clearly 
articulated, and the „logic of no alternative‟ prevented from becoming accepted by policy-
makers as truth, with all the consequences for accumulation and legitimation that the 
contradictions therein imply.  
                                                        
i The „Treasury View‟ presented in this paper does not intend to suggest there was unanimity 
of opinion within the institution, but reflects what the documents reveal about the 
preferences of those in key roles, with the most access to the political level.   
ii For instance, on the return to the Gold Standard, see Kettell (2004), on the abandonment of 
the Gold Standard, see Kunz (1987), and on the debate over operation Robot in 1952, see 
Burnham (2003).  
iii Similar arguments had been made in January and March 1976.  See TNA CAB 134/4048, 
MES (76) 12, 29th January 1976, and TNA CAB 134/4048, MES (76) 32, 12 March 1976. 
iv The discussions are recorded in TNA CAB 128/60, CM (76) 38th Conclusions and CM (76) 
39th Conclusions, 7 December 1976. 
 
 29 
* Thanks to Dr. Ben Clift and anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper, and to the ESRC for providing the funding to undertake this research (award number 
PTA-031-2005-00139).  
References 
Andrews, D. M. (1994) „Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of 
International Monetary Relations‟ International Studies Quarterly, 38 (2), 193-218 
Bank of England (1976) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 16 (3), London: Bank of England  
Bernstein, K. (1983) „The International Monetary Fund and Deficit Countries: The Case of 
Britain 1974-1977‟. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Stanford University 
Browning, P. (1986) The Treasury and Economic Policy, 1964-1985. London: Longman. 
Burk, K. and Cairncross, A. (1992) ‘Goodbye, Great Britain’: The 1976 IMF Crisis, New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press. 
Burnham, P. (1999) „The Politics of Economic Management in the 1990s‟ New Political 
Economy, 4 (1), 37-54 
Burnham, P. (2001) „New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation‟ British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, 3 (2), 127-149 
Burnham, P. (2003), Remaking the Postwar World Economy: Robot and British Policy in the 1950s, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Burnham, P. (2008) „Parliamentary Socialism, Labourism and Beyond‟ in Wetherly, P., 
Barrow, C. W. and Burnham, P. (eds.) (2008) Class, Power and the State in Capitalist Society: 
Essays on Ralph Miliband, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 48-63 
Cohen, B. J. (1998) The Geography of Money, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Dell, E. (1996) The Chancellors: A History of the Chancellors of the Exchequer 1945-1990, London: 
Harper Collins.  
 30 
Fay, S. and Young, H. (1978) „The Day the £ Nearly Died‟ The Sunday Times, 14, 21 and 28 
May 1978  
Flinders, M. and Buller, J. (2006) „Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools‟ British Politics, 
1 (3), 293-318 
Hall, P. A. (1993) „Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State‟ Comparative Politics, 25 (3), 
275-296 
Harmon, M. D. (1997) The British Labour Government and the 1976 IMF Crisis, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan.  
Hay, C. (1998) „Globalisation, Welfare Retrenchment and „the Logic of No Alternative‟: Why 
Second-best Won‟t Do‟ Journal of Social Policy 27 (2), 525-532. 
Helleiner, E. (1992) „States and the future of global finance‟ Review of International Studies, 18 
(1), 31-49. 
Hickson, K. (2005) The IMF Crisis of 1976 and British Politics, London and New York: Taurus 
Academic Studies. 
Kettell, S. (2004) The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy-Making: From the Gold Standard to 
the Euro, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kettell, S. (2008) „Does Depoliticisation Work? Evidence from Britain‟s Membership of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism, 1990-92‟ British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 10 (4), 630-648. 
Koelble, T. A. (1987) „Trade Unionists, Party Activists, and Politicians: The Struggle for 
Power over Party Rules in the British Labour Party and the West German Social 
Democratic Party‟ Comparative Politics, 19 (3), 253-266 
Kunz, D. B. (1987) The battle for Britain’s gold standard in 1931, Beckenham: Croon Helm. 
Labour Party (1974a) „Let us work together – Labour‟s way out of the crisis‟ in Dale, I. ed. 
(1999) Labour Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997, London: Routledge, 181-192 
 31 
Labour Party (1974b) „Britain will win with Labour‟ in Dale, I. ed. (1999) Labour Party General 
Election Manifestos, 1900-1997, London: Routledge, 194-213 
Ludlam, S. (1992) „The Gnomes of Washington: Four Myths of the 1976 IMF Crisis‟ Political 
Studies, 40 (4), 713-727  
Pliatzky, L. (1984) Getting and Spending: Public Expenditure, Employment and Inflation, Revised 
Edition, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Taylor, R. (2000) The TUC: From the General Strike to New Unionism, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
TNA CAB 128/59, Meetings: 1-22 
TNA CAB 128/60, Meetings: 23-43 
TNA CAB 129/189, Papers: 1-25 
TNA CAB 129/190, Papers: 26-50 
TNA CAB 129/193, Papers: 111-137 
TNA CAB 134/4025, Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy: meetings and papers 
TNA CAB 134/4026, Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy: papers 
TNA CAB 134/4048, Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy: meetings and papers  
TNA PREM 16/800, Sterling/Dollar parity: measures to support sterling 
TNA PREM 16/803, International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to support sterling 
TNA PREM 16/805, International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to support sterling 
TNA PREM 16/808, International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to support sterling 
TNA PREM 16/836, Economic strategy 
TNA T 277/3053, Policy Co-ordinating Committee: papers 
TNA T 277/3175, Policy Co-ordinating Committee: minutes  
TNA T 277/3178, Policy Co-ordinating Committee: memoranda  
TNA T 358/207, UK interest rates strategy and management of the Sterling Rate 
TNA T 364/17, Economic Strategy 
 32 
TNA T 364/50, International Monetary Fund (IMF) including Letter of Intent 
TNA T 371/87, Public Expenditure 1976-1977: contingency planning; general papers  
TNA T 378/22, Exchange rate policy: general papers; devaluation and the trade balance 
TNA T 381/15, International Monetary Fund (IMF) drawings by the UK 
TNA T 381/16, International Monetary Fund (IMF) drawings by the UK 
TNA T 381/17, International Monetary Fund (IMF) drawings by the UK 
TUC / Labour Party Liaison Committee (1973) „Economic Policy and the Cost of Living‟ 
Report of the 105th Annual Trades Union Congress, London: TUC, 312-315 
Wass, D. (2008) Decline to Fall: The Making of British Macro-Economic Policy and the 1976 IMF 
Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Watson, M. (2006) Foundations of International Political Economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Watson, M. and Hay, C. (2003) „The discourse of globalisation and the logic of no alternative: 
rendering the contingent necessary in the political economic of New Labour‟ Policy & 
Politics, 31 (3), 289-305 
Wickham-Jones, M. (1996) Economic Strategy and the Labour Party: Politics and policy-making, 1970-
1983, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
